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aiid those of establishing the settlor's intent and revocation could be most
efficiently handled by a: codification similar to that of New Jersey.35
Finally it may be urged that the savings-account trust is a useful device be-
cause of the simplicity of its operation over other forms of estate transfer." It
-eliminates many expenses of administration, and it provides a simple solution to
routine problems of cash management and estate transfer.
34N.J. Rev. Stat. (1954) § 17:9A-216. Consult 4 Powell, Real Property § 571, at 437
(1954) for problems left unresolved by the New Jersey codification.
36 A minimum of nine months is required to wind up an estate in which a will is involved.
111.-Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 3, § 242. A contest may postpone distribution for a number of years.
Distribution under the Illinois "small estates" provision is of limited use because its relatively
informal procedure is available only for estates of less than $1,000.00. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1954)
c. 3, 6-478.
VOTING ELIGIBILITY UNDER NLRA § 9(c)(3) OF UNREPLACED
ECONOMIC STRIKERS SUBJECT TO DISCHARGE
FOR WRONGFUL CONDUCT
Section 9(c) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,1 provides,
in part, that "[e]mployees on strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall
riot be eligible to vote" in a representation election. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia was recently called upon to make the first judicial deter-
mination of the impact of this provision on the voting eligibility of non-replaced
strikers guilty of misconduct during a strike.2
While an economic'- strike against the Union Manufacturing Company was
in progress, an election was held to determine whether the American Federation
of Hosiery Workers, A.F. of L., was to be certified as the employees' bargaining
representative. The company challenged the voting eligibility of a number of the
strikers on the ground of their misconduct 4 during the strike. The disputed
" f61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (Supp., 1955).
2 Union Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F. 2d 532 (App. D.C., 1955), cert. denied 349 U.S. 921
(-1955).
2The NLRB has distinguished between "unfair labor practice" strikes, i.e., strikes provoked
or prolonged by-an employer's unfair labor practice, and "economic" strikes, i.e., strikes called
to obtain economic benefits such as changes in wages, hours or other working conditions. See
"NLRB v. A. Sartorius & Co., 140 F. 2d 203 (C.A. 2d, 1944). The primary importance of the
distinction is in its bearing on an employer's right to replace strikers. An employer is at liberty
permanently to replace "economic" strikers. E.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,
304 U.S. 333 (1938). In contrast, strikers in an "unfair labor practice" strike are entitled to
reinstatement even if they have been replaced. E.g., Wheatland Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
NLRB, 208 F. 2d 878 (C.A. 10th, 1953), cert. denied 347 U.S. 966 (1954). Unless otherwise
indicated, ensuing discussion will have reference to "economic" strikes and strikers.
4 udge Danaher's- dissenting opinion states that the strikers were charged with "debar-
ment, violence, mass picketing, and generally lawless conduct on the picket line." Union Mfg.
Co.-v. NLRB; 221 F. 2d 532, 537 (App. D.C., 1955), cert. denied 349 U.S. 921 (1955). Such
acts of misconduct, if proven, are sufficient to warrant a denial of reinstatement. NLRB v.
Perfect Circle Co., 162 F. 2d 566 (C.A. 7th, 1949) (debarment); NLRB v. Ohio Calcium Co.,
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votes turned out to be decisive, and, the challenges having been overruled by
the Board and the union certified, the company refused to bargain with the
union. On appeal from the Board's order adjudging this to be an unfair labor
practice, the company supported its position by a literal reading of section
9(c)(3), urging that since the strikers because of their misconduct were not
"entitled to reinstatement" they were also ineligible to vote. The Board rejected
this literal construction on the ground that the legislative history showed that
the section's sole purpose was to bar from voting only such strikers as had
actually been replaced. The court, with Judge Danaher dissenting, adopted the
Board's construction and ordered enforcement.'
The court's justification for recourse to the legislative history is open to ques-
tion,' since the statutory language seems clear. Reference to the legislative his-
tory in this case, however, is in accord with the general tendency of the Board
and the courts to take some liberties with statutory language which appears in-
consistent with a purpose revealed in or constructed from the legislative his-
tory.7 In any event, the legislative history of section 9(c)(3) casts very little
light on the question here involved because debate centered on the problem of
determining the right to vote as between economic strikers and their replace-
ments. The proponents of this section were severely critical8 of the Board's prior
133 F. 2d 721 (C.A. 6th, 1943) (violence); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. NLRB, 190 F. 2d 832 (C.A.
7th, 1951) (mass picketing). In general, the term "strike misconduct" has reference to two
categories of activity: First, conduct proscribed by the Act such as striking prior to the ex-
piration of the 60-day "cooling off" period required by section 8(d)(4), and second, activity
which, though not prohibited, is not protected by the Act and may be illegal under state or
local law. This latter category comprehends misconduct such as violence and similarly coercive
activity.
5 The seriousness of the misconduct involved apparently was considered immaterial as the
court held that the Board was correct as a matter of law in overruling without a hearing the
employer's challenges. For the purposes of this note, further references to misconduct will
assume that it is of such a type as to warrant discharge or denial of reinstatement,
6 In justifying resort to the legislative history, the court said: "In the light of these opposing
contentions [by the Board and the company] we think the disputed sentence is ambiguous. On
the face of it both contentions have reasonable support. Since the sentence upon its face is
ambiguous we turn to the legislative history to try to ascertain its meaning from its purpose."
Union Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F. 2d 532, 534 (App. D.C., 1955).
7 The Supreme Court has made extremely free use of extrinsic aids in interpreting labor
legislation. See Ass'n of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S.
437, 445-49 (1955) (committee reports, debates and hearings); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96,
100 (1954) (committee reports and debates); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675,
686-87 (1951) (conference reports, debates and hearings). In a non-labor case, Harrison v.
Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476 (1943), the Court held that it was reversible error for a
lower court to refuse to consider the legislative history of the statute there involved, even
though the relevant provision was on its face unambiguous. For a general discussion of the
federal courts' use of legislative history consult A Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative
History in the Federal Courts, 52 Col. L, Rev. 125 (1952).
$ Consult, e.g., the remarks of Senator Ball, 2 Legislative History of the Labor-Management
Relations Act 957 (1948) (hereinafter cited as '.Legis. Hist.").
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determination. Originally the Board had decided that strikers but not their re-
placements were to be considered eligible to vote in a representation election: 9
In 1941 in the Wurlitzer ° case the Board modified its position and permitted
both groups to vote. Since an. employer is not required to take back strikers who
have been permanently replaced," the later Board policy created, in the words
of one of the Taft-Hartley supporters, "the ridiculous situation of a thousand
persons voting for a bargaining agent for only, 500 jobs."' 2 Section 9(c) (3) was
intended to correct this situation by denying strikers who have been permanent-
ly replaced (and thus, under the Mackay3 doctrine, are "not entitled to.rein-
statement") the right to vote.14 It would seem to follow that the general purpose
underlying the section was to accord voting rights only to those strikers whose
expectancy of continued employment in a bargaining unit is sufficiently high tb
give them a clear-cut interest in the selection of the bargaining representative,!s
I In view of this general purpose a determination of the voting eligibility of
strikers who are subject to discharge for cause as well as replacement would
appear to involve an assessment of the job expectancies of such strikers. This
determination would also involve two countervailing factors which might jus-
tify voting ineligibility despite a high job expectancy on the part of such strikers.
First, there is a possibility that recognition of voting eligibility for undischarged
misconduct strikers would unjustifiably confront the employer with the trouble-
some alternatives of either (a) discharging strikers prior to an election,, even
though there had not been adequate time to identify wrongdoers and to deter-
mine whether their discharge was justified by legal and business considerations,
9 A. Sartorius & Co., 10 N.L.R.B..493 (1938).
10 Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 32'N.L.R.B. 163 (1941).
1 NLR1B v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
122 Legis. Hist. 1102.
1'NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
14 One explanation for the section's not being phrased in terms of replaced strikers may be
found in the distinction between "economic" and "unfair labor practice" strikers. See note 3
supra. To have worded the sentence in terms of replacement would have denied replaced.work-
ers in the latter group voting eligibility, a result the adopted terminology avoids. The allocation
of voting rights embodied in section 9(c)(3) was severely criticized as being a union-busting
measure, Senator Murray's comments being typical in this respect. 2 Legis. Hist. 1041. Fr an
appraisal of section 9(c)(3)'s effect, consult Right To' Vote during an Economic Strike, 16 U.
of Chj. L. Rev. 537 (1949).
Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act to eliminate the alleged "union-busting" aspects of
section 9(c)(3) were first proposed in President Eisenhower's State of the Union message of
1954. 100 Cong. Rec. 128 (1954). The.changes suggested would have prevented a rival union
from challenging the incumbent striking union's status as bargaining representative for'
period of four months and~would have prohibited such challenge by the employer'for :the
length of the strike or a period of one year, whichever wag shorter. Though legislation erm-
bodying these proposals was introduced by Senator Smith, 100 Cong. Rec. 93 (1954),.the billg
faled:to pass, both Houses.
5 In addition to excluding strikers who have been replaced, the statutory language clearly
is broad enough to cover strikers who have bee,discharged for cause and thus,.under section
10(c), may not be reinstated by Board.o'rder.
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or (b) losing his right to discharge because his inaction had permitted the wrong-
doers to vote and thereby had implied that they would continue to be part of the
labor force. Secondly, the desirability of using disenfranchisement as a sanction
against strike misconduct might be considered as overriding the objective of
equating voting rights with job expectancies. Neither the Board nor the court
dealt adequately with the foregoing considerations, which are discussed below.
An unreplaced striker who has not been guilty of misconduct has, while not
an absolute right to reinstatement at the termination of a strike," a high ex-
pectancy of reinstatement, subject primarily to the employer's need for his
services 7 and his continued capacity to do the work.18 His post-strike job ex-
pectancy is thus sufficient to accord him voting rights. Where, however, the
unreplaced striker has engaged in misconduct, his expectancy is subject to an
additional contingency, namely, that the employer may exercise his right to dis-
charge him. Although this added contingency reduces the probability of rein-
statement for the culpable employees, it is difficult to determine what weight
should be given to it. Whether it is to be taken into account in determining vot-
ing-eligibility should depend in part on whether there is any justification for the
employer's failure to clarify the reinstatement expectancies of the misconduct
striker by either exercising or clearly waiving his discharge rights.
The dissenting opinion attempted to justify such inaction on the ground that
requiring the employer to discharge prior to election any misconduct striker
whom he wishes to disenfranchise involves the risk of an unfair labor practice
(a) if the employer mistakenly discharges an innocent employee'9 or (b) if the
1'See NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F. 2d 87, 92 (C.A. 4th, 1953), cert. denied
347 U.S. 935 (1954), where the court stated that, in general, "an employer may freely dis-
charge an employee, or refuse to reinstate an employee, for any reason, good, bad or indif-
ferent, provided the discharge or refusal to reinstate does not cut across or deny some right or
activity of the employee, guaranteed by the Act, such as collective bargaining, striking or
joining a Union."
17 A variety of factors may cause a reduction in the post-strike labor force with the result
of there being fewer jobs available than there are strikers otherwise entitled to reinstatement.
Here the employer cannot be required to take back strikers whom he does not need. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Nat'l Die Casting Co., 207 F. 2d 344 (C.A. 7th, 1953) (technological changes re-
duced need for workers). But the Board may require the employer to place the names of un-
replaced workers for whom jobs cannot be found on a preferential hiring list, filling jobs from
this list as they become available on a basis of seniority. See, e.g., Earl I. Sifers, 92 N.L.R.B.
1221, 1238 (1951). But cf. Sax v. NLRB, 171 F. 2d 769 (C.A. 7th, 1948).
S8 An employer is not obliged to reinstate strikers not physically fit for work. NLRB v. In-
dustrial Cotton Mills, 208 F. 2d 87 (C.A. 4th, 1953), cert. denied 347 U.S. 935 (1954); see
NLRB v. Republican Publishing Co., 180 F. 2d 437, 440 (C.A. 1st, 1950).
19 There is some conflict among the circuits as to whether a mistaken discharge, if made in
good- faith, is an unfair labor practice. A majority hold that it is, and that a Board order of re-
instatement may properly issue. NLRB v. Cambria Clay Products Co., 215 F. 2d 48 (C.A.
6th, 1954); NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F. 2d 87 (C.A. 4th, 1953), cert. denied
347 U.S. 935 (1954); Salt River Valley Water Users Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F. 2d 325 (C.A. 9th,
1953); Cusano v. NLR.B, 190 F. 2d 898 (C.A. 3d, 1951). Contra: Local No. 3, United Packing-
house Workers, C.I.O. v. NLRB, 210 F. 2d 325 (C.A. 8th, 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 822
(1954); Rubin Brothers Footwear, Inc. v. NLRB, 203 F. 2d 486 (C.A. 5th, 1953) (semble).
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Board in such a situation should interpret the discharge as an attempt to inter-
fere with protected activity in the form of a strike. 0 This ground is not persua-
sive. Such risks are inevitable whenever the employer decides to discharge a
striker for alleged strike misconduct or other forms of alleged misconduct which
are ultimately held to be protected activity. The fact that the employer must
make his decision shortly before an election does not in and of itself constitute a
reason for insulating him against such risks. An intervening election does not,
in short, justify an employer's use of the Board's election procedure as a device
for securing an advisory opinion as to the legality of contemplated disciplinary
action.
The employer may, however, be faced with a situation where misconduct
occurs so close in time to a scheduled election as to preclude the investigation
and deliberation necessary for the prudent exercise of his right to discharge. In
such a situation the employer may urge that the doubt which exists at the time
of the election as to the culpable employee's future employment results not from
procrastination, but from the employer's desire to exercise his rights intelli-
gently and to comply with the law. In most cases, the Board's present proce-
dures would obviate the necessity for a precipitous decision. Where acts of mis-
conduct are attributable to the union, and thus constitute violations of the
statute, the employer by filing an unfair labor practice charge may delay the
election and thereby secure additional time to reach a decision.2 1 Where acts of
coercion take place shortly prior to balloting the Board has held that it may set
the election aside,2 2 and while the question has not been decided it would seem
that the rationale which justifies setting an election aside might also justify
postponement until the effects of the coercive activity have been dissipated-
thus-once again giving the employer time for deliberation .2
20 Union Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F. 2d 532, 538 (App. D.C., 1955), cert. denied 349 U.S.
921 (1955). The cases cited by judge Danaher on this point do not support an implication
that a discharge for cause can be an unfair labor practice. They merely hold that the Board
may properly determine whether a discharge was in fact for cause or whether it was an at-
tempt to interfere with a strike by eliminating a union supporter.
21 During the pendency of such a charge, the Board's usual practice is to postpone holding
the election until the charge has been disposed of. See Columbia Pictures Corp., 81 N.L.R.B.
1313 (1949).
22 The rationale of the Board is that an election held in an "atmosphere of confusion and
fear of reprisal... renders impossible the rational, uncoerced selection of a bargaining repre-
sentative." Diamond State Poultry Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 3, 6 (1953). See further G. H. Hess,
Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 463 (1949).
2 3 In the unusual situation, where the misconduct, though sufficient to warrant discharge,
does not justify postponing the election under the Board's present policy and does not consti-
tute animfair labor practice, there is apparently no existing procedure which would guarantee
the employer reasonable time in which to act. However, considering the desirability of an
expeditious determination of the unit representative, it would not seem advisable to establish
a procedure for postponing the election merely to give the employer time to determine the
identity of the culpable strikers and to reach a decision as to his position toward these strikers.
At the same time, allowing the misconduct strikers to vote should not, in all cases, prejudice
the employer's rights of discharge. Consult p. 313 infra.
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Whatever difficulties may confront an employer in unusual situations, in the
Union Manufacturing case the acts of misconduct occurred respectively one and
three months prior to the election,2' and there was no showing of any special
obstacles in the way of a decision by the employer as to whether he would exer-
cise his discharge rights. The absence of any such showing suggests that the
employer may have been attempting both to retain his culpable employees and
to disenfranchise them. To permit such an attempt to succeed would seem in-
consistent with section 9(c) (3)'s basic purpose of equating job expectancy and
votin.g rights.
It would appear to be equally inconsistent with this basic purpose to permit
an employer to discharge strikers on the ground of misconduct occurring prior
to election after the striker's voting rights were recognized as a result of the
employer's inaction, unless such inaction were justified by unusual circum-
stances. Section 9(c)(3) was designed not only to permit employees with an
expectancy of reinstatement to vote, but also to disenfranchise those without
such expectancies. A strong argument can be made that in order to implement
this purpose an employer who fails without good reason to destroy voting eligi-
bility by discharge prior to an election should be barred from discharging strikers
thereafter. Since his inaction preserved for the strikers the status of employees
for voting purposes, the employer could justifiably be estopped from thereafter
destroying this status on the basis of pre-election conduct. There would, accord-
ingly, be strong reasons for applying the Board's condonation doctrines in the
foregoing situation. Where, however, the employer's inaction results from an
inability to ascertain which of the strikers have engaged in misconduct, he
might, under a recent decision of the Board, protect himself by giving notice of
24 Brief for the Board at 31.
25 While condonation "may not lightly be presumed from mere silence or equivocal state-
ments, but must clearly appear from some positive act by an employer indicating forgiveness
and an intention of treating the guilty employees as if their misconduct had not occurred,"
NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F. 2d 409,414 (C.A. 5th, 1955), the Board-
and the courts-have found condonation in employers' acts which are not so clearly indicative
of forgiveness as the permitting of a misconduct striker to vote. NLRB v. Wailick, 198 F. 2d
477 (C.A. 3d, 1952) (employer made provisions for strikers to sign as "employees" in a letter);
Carey Salt Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1946) (employer retained a misconduct striker's name on his
seniority list); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F. 2d 874 (C.A. 1st, 1941), cert. denied
313 U.S. 595 (1941) (employer reinstated strikers guilty of similar misconduct); Stewart
Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F. 2d 849 (C.A. 7th, 1940), cert. denied 312 U.S. 680 (1941)
(employer urged all striking employees to return without excluding those who had engaged in
misconduct).
The condonation problem raised by the Union Mfg. decision is not often likely to arise. The
sequence of events necessary would have to include (1) an economic strike, (2) an election held
during this strike, (3) misconduct prior to the election, (4) failure to discharge for the mis-
conduct prior to the election, (5) application for reinstatement by the employee, (6) post-
election discharge or refusal to reinstate on the ground of the misconduct and (7) filing of an
unfair labor practice charge against the employer. Given this configuration, however, the
Board may conclude, in view of the condonation cases and the policy underlying section
9(c) (3), that the right to discharge or to deny reinstatement has been waived.
19561 COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
his intention to reserve his right to discharge pending the outcome of investiga-
tion.26 This would, of course, allow the employer later to -discharge voters, but
no system can guarantee the complete identity of the voting group with the
post-strike labor force.27  "
The foregoing discussion suggests that in the ordinary situation the alterna-
tives facing employers confronted with strike misconduct do not justify any
limitations on the policy of equating voting rights and job expectancy. Whether
this general purpose should be qualified in order to use disenfranchisement of
culpable strikers as an indirect sanction against misconduct, an argument
pressed by the dissenter,28 is a more troublesome problem. An immediate dif-
ficulty, which was neglected in the judicial opinions and adumbrated by the
Board's, is suggested by section 8(d)2 9 of the Act. This section, which prohibits
strikes prior to the expiration of a 60-day "cooling off" period, also provides that
an employee who strikes during this period shall lose his voting rights. This loss
of voting eligibility is automatic and, unlike the position taken by the court in
construing section 9(c) (3), does not depend on affirmative discharge action by
the employer.
It might be urged that the express provision for disenfranchisement as a sanc-
tion against misconduct proscribed by section 8(d) impliedly excludes the use of
this sanction against other forms of misconduct. This argument is, however,
questionable for two reasons. First, other forms of misconduct such as violence,
property destruction and sit-down strikes are at least as grave as strikes during
the 60-day period. If the statute is interpreted as representing a deliberate choice
by Congress between forms of misconduct sufficiently serious to bring disen-
franchisement into play as an indirect sanction, the implied distinction between
60-day strikes and other forms of misconduct would be difficult to justify. Sec-
ondly, the legislative history suggests a more persuasive explanation for the spe-
cific concern of Congress with the voting eligibility of 60-day strikers and its
contrasting silence concerning the eligibility of strikers guilty of other forms of
strike misconduct. Strike misconduct such as violence had been held by the
courts to be unprotected activity prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley
Act. 0 On the other hand, a strike during the 60-day period was proscribed and
designated as unprotected activity for the first time by the Taft-Hartley amend-
26 In Merck & Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 67 (1954), the Board held that where the employer offered
reinstatement but expressly reserved the right to discharge strikers who had been guilty
of misconduct, and upon conviction by a local court discharged such a misconduct striker,
the right to discharge had not been waived by the conditional re-employment.
27 The section's purpose is inevitably frustrated whenever the cause privileging an em-
ployer's denial of reinstatement arises after an election.
28 Union Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F. 2d 532, 540-41 (App. D.C., 1955), cert. denied 349
U.S. 921 (1955).
21 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, § 8(d)(1), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 158 (Supp., 1955).
10 The leading case is NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Co., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
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ments. This fact tends to explain why Congress, after delineating the new cate-
gory of unprotected activity, went on to deal with the sanctions which could be
directed against such misconduct. This explanation is reinforced by the legisla-
tive history which shows that provisions expressly withdrawing the protection
of the Act from employees guilty of other forms of misconduct were abandoned
solely on the ground that established precedent made such provisions unneces-
sary-s3
Whether the policy of using disenfranchisement as a sanction against mis-
conduct, reflected in section 8(d), should be extended beyond the 60-day strike
situation is thus a question left open by Congress. As the majority opinion sug-
gests, the sanction is of doubtful value as a deterrent. 2 Moreover, to apply a
disenfranchisement policy regardless of the gravity of the offense and regardless
of the reinstatement expectancy of the culpable employee would frustrate the
basic policy underlying section 9(c)(3). To draw distinctions based on the
gravity of the offense would make lesser inroads on that policy, but would in
turn raise two objections. First, it would confront the Board with the necessity
of drawing difficult and delicate distinctions" without any statutory guide as to
the relevant factors. Second, the necessity for a Board determination may
seriously impede the expeditious selection of a bargaining agent if a decisive
number of voters are challenged for strike misconduct.34
The foregoing examination of the factors relevant to the issue raised by the
Union Manufacturing case raises a serious question as to whether the legislative
history to which the Board and the court had resort justifies the result reached.
Nevertheless, the deficiency in the statutory drafting produced a troublesome
problem, and the court's resolution is supported by strong considerations of pol-
icy and practicality. The result-of the decision is that an intervening election
may force an employer to decide what to do about misconduct strikers somewhat
earlier than he would otherwise be obliged to. But any detriment involved to
either employer or employee would seem outweighed by the desirability of not
disenfranchising employees whose interests may be directly affected by the
choice of a bargaining agent.
31 1 Legis. Hist. 562-63.
Union Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F. 2d 532, 536 (App. D.C., 1955), cert. denied 349 U.S.
921 (1955).
3- In NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F. 2d 811 (C.A. 7th, 1946), the court stated its
belief that "courts have recognfized that a distinction is to be drawn between cases where
employees engaged in concerted activities exceed the bounds of lawful conduct in 'a moment
of animal exuberance' . . . and those flagrant cases in which the misconduct is so violent or
of such serious character as to render the employee unfit for further service." Ibid., at 815.
The difficult problem arises when the misconduct in question lies between these extremes.
31 In the instant case, out of a total of 157 ballots cast 82 were. challenged on the ground
of strike misconduct. Union Mfg. Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1952). .f the number of ballots
challenged is sufficient to affect the xesult of the election, the regional director must investigate
the challenges and issue a report. If exceptions are filed to this report a hearing may be ordered
by the Board. NLRB, Rules and Regulations § 102.61 (1952).
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